North Korea’s Military Potential Could Surpass South Korea’s by 2028 With Chinese and Russian Support

North Korea’s rearmament in partnership with China and Russia could put the country on track to gain a military edge over South Korea by 2028-2029.

That is the conclusion reached by the Solid Info think tank.

The pace of serial launcher production and deliveries to the military, the inflow of military technology and joint Russian-Chinese component supplies are creating the potential for a future advantage in unmanned systems, massed firepower and tactical nuclear delivery systems.

Pyongyang is incorporating lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian war into the Korean People’s Army’s operational doctrine and training. As of January 2026, North Korean units with more than 12,000 personnel have been conducting aerial and artillery reconnaissance, adjusting fire, and operating in an environment of intensive FPV drone and electronic warfare use.

Pyongyang is supporting these doctrinal changes with dedicated production infrastructure. Drone development and testing are concentrated at the Unmanned Aviation Technologies Complex, which includes a specialized Drone Institute and associated closed facilities.

In the Panhyon area, airframe production is separated from final assembly, electronics integration and flight testing. Seven new hangars, each about 40 meters wide, are creating the infrastructure needed to expand the fleet of large UAVs.
In Kusong, a 225-meter assembly building was completed in early 2026 and connected to two other buildings to form a single 415-meter-long facility. Satellite analysis links the facility to the expansion of North Korea’s drone program.

Pyongyang is therefore preparing to scale up production of a full range of reconnaissance, strike and loitering systems, as well as UGVs.

North Korea is also exploring the integration of low-yield nuclear warheads onto unmanned platforms to destroy fortified positions. Such systems could undermine the effectiveness of the fortification network South Korea has developed since the Korean War.

This may also be linked to the construction and concealment of a facility at Plant No. 11 in Hamhung, which manufactures Hwasong-11 series short-range ballistic missiles (KN-23).

Russia and China are playing different roles in accelerating North Korea’s drone program. Moscow is providing access to combat experience, operator training and resource supplies. This is also linked to the construction of a bridge between the two countries. China’s commercial market provides access to engines, optics, microcontrollers, circuit boards, composites and manufacturing equipment.

South Korea’s defense industry is increasing production of tanks and armored vehicles, which are rapidly losing their survivability on a battlefield saturated with drones. This advantage could allow Pyongyang to impose an asymmetric war on Seoul, in which inexpensive strike assets systematically force the use of more costly resources for detection, interception, and recovery.