CIT Analysts: Russia Capable of Producing Up to 300 T-90M Tanks Per Year

The actual production volume of Russia’s T-90M tanks may be significantly higher than previously reported estimates, according to new analysis by the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), which suggests Russia could be manufacturing several hundred units annually.

This assessment was detailed in the team’s latest report.

CIT analysts challenge the recent estimates presented by Michael Kofman in The Economist, which indicated that Russia had produced only 28–30 new T-90M tanks in 2024 and had modernized approximately 60 additional tanks based on older T-90 models.

In its assessment, CIT relies on data related to the export production of the manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod. Since 2001, the plant has been fully engaged in fulfilling orders for both the complete production of tanks and the supply of kit components (sets of disassembled parts and assemblies) for subsequent assembly in India.

Even without accounting for the production of these assembly kits, the plant was capable of producing up to 140 tanks per year during peak periods. Over a span of 20 years, it exceeded the 100-tank annual mark on six occasions. The fact that the production of assembly kits was carried out simultaneously during these peak years indicates that the manufacturing of armored hulls, turrets, and other key components was not operating at full capacity. This suggests that the plant had the potential to increase its output of fully assembled tanks to as many as 180 units per year. From this, it can be inferred that Uralvagonzavod retained significant manufacturing capacity even during the challenging years for Russia’s defense industry in the 1990s and 2000s.

In total, prior to the full-scale invasion, the tank manufacturing conglomerate delivered between 435 and 465 T-90 tanks of all variants to the Russian Army. According to analysts’ estimates, the plant produced between 120 and 150 original T-90 Vladimir tanks for Russia, as well as between 281 and 283 T-90A units. These figures are significant, as some of these vehicles were later used as the basis for conversion into the T-90M variant.

In 2020–2021, Russia began producing T-90M for its own armed forces, signing four contracts for the delivery of at least 160 tanks. According to unofficial data, 40 of these were newly built, while another 120 were modernized. The lack of the details regarding the fourth contract does not significantly affect this estimate, as it was signed only a few months before the invasion and was likely not fulfilled in time.

Despite initial challenges in organizing the serial production of the T-90M tanks, Uralvagonzavod eventually resolved these issues and began regular deliveries, albeit several years later than originally planned.

During 2020–2021, the plant produced tanks at the following pace: over eight months from April to November 2020, 10 tanks were manufactured; over the next five months (through March 2021), the plant produced another eight tanks; and in the following six months (by August 2021), 18 more units were delivered. The plant aimed to reach an annual production volume of 65 tanks, including both newly built and modernized vehicles.

“If we assume that Uralvagonzavod successfully fulfilled its 2021 production plan, then up to 39 additional T-90M tanks were delivered. This would mean that, by the time of the invasion, the Russian Armed Forces may have had between 66 and 85 T-90M tanks in service, plus another 10 at the Kazan Higher Tank Command School,” the analysts state.

Thus, according to their estimates, by the beginning of 2022, the Russian Army possessed 65–85 T-90M tanks and 370–380 units of older variants. They emphasize that these figures highlight an overestimation of at least 150 tanks in the 2022 edition of The Military Balance.

Discrepancies in Data and Estimates

Although official reports state that only around 30 new T-90M tanks were produced in 2024, CIT points out that the actual scale is likely much larger. The analysts highlight changes in batch sizes during the war — open-source videos show train convoys transporting 20–30 tanks at a time, whereas official announcements typically mention batches of only 10–15 units.

Additionally, the analysts draw attention to the rate of losses. According to OSINT data on battlefield losses (Oryx, WarSpotting), there have been between 110 and 137 visually confirmed T-90M losses since the start of the war, including destroyed, damaged, and captured vehicles. This suggests a significantly higher production volume than estimated by some Western experts.

What could these production volumes be? Analysts note that in the 2000s and 2010s, the plant was capable of producing up to 140 tanks per year, while simultaneously manufacturing tank kits for assembly at foreign factories. During that period, Uralvagonzavod operated under peacetime conditions, without switching to a 24-hour, three-shift work schedule or extensive overtime as is the case now during wartime. The implementation of a 24-hour production cycle has likely allowed the plant to surpass those previous figures.

Thus, according to analysts’ estimates, T-90M production in 2022 was around 60–70 units. In 2023, production volumes further increased due to additional hiring and the transition to a three-shift work schedule. It is likely that during this period, production could have reached 140–180 tanks per year, and by 2024, exceeded 250—possibly even 300—tanks annually.

A recent Wall Street Journal article cited Western intelligence sources estimating current production at approximately 300 tanks per year. CIT, citing its own sources, confirms this figure, reporting production of around 280 T-90M tanks in 2024.

Challenges and Scaling of Production

Faced with international sanctions, the Russian tank manufacturing industry encountered difficulties primarily related to access to high-tech equipment and components. Notably, on some T-72B3M and T-80BVM tanks produced after the invasion began, the tank gunner’s Sosna-U sight was replaced with a simpler 1PN96MT thermal sight. However, this replacement did not affect the T-90M tanks, which continued to be produced with Sosna-U sights. Moreover, the situation returned to normal during 2023 for other tank models as well.

Additionally, according to data from Gjerstad published in The Washington Post, since late 2023, laser sensors on the barrels of T-90M guns have disappeared from newly produced tanks, indicating limitations within the Russian defense industry. Nevertheless, this has not critically reduced the effectiveness of the tanks under modern combat conditions.

On the other hand, the Russian tank manufacturing conglomerate did not face significant issues with human resources: at the time of the CIT’s research, there were 68 vacancies at Uralvagonzavod across various positions, including engineering and direct production roles such as turner, milling machine operator, drill operator, and CNC machine operator. However, considering that the total workforce at Uralvagonzavod is estimated at over 20,000 employees, even 600 vacancies would represent only a 3% shortage. This indicates an absence of a significant labor shortage at the plant, which seems plausible given the strategic importance of the facility and the state defense contracts it fulfills.

Nizhny Tagil’s Uralvagonzavod is expanding the production of hulls for new tanks. This is evidenced by a tender identified by analysts, announced by the plant in April 2024, with a total value of over RUB 158 million (approximately $2 million) for work to reinforce the metal frame structures of the cold stamping workshop, Thermal Workshop No. 3, and Mechanical Assembly Workshop No. 6 as part of a project titled “Reconstruction and Technical Re-equipment of Armored Hull Production Workshops.” The work, which includes reinforcing support structures for skylights in the workshops, is planned to be completed by November 2025.

Another tender announced in April 2023 was valued at over RUB 277 million (approximately $3.5 million) and involved the supply and commissioning of a universal welding station for hulls. According to the documentation, the work was to be completed by July 2024. Notably, the contract stipulates that the equipment must operate around the clock.

Finally, a third tender identified by us, valued at over RUB 91 million rubles (approximately $1.15 million), was announced in March 2023. According to its terms, the contractor was to deliver and commission a hull machining stand by March 2024. As in the previous case, the equipment was designed for continuous 24-hour operation.

The Conflict Intelligence Team notes that most procurement data from defense industry enterprises has not been publicly available since 2022 due to security concerns. Therefore, it is likely that Uralvagonzavod is engaged in other types of procurement aimed at expanding production.

They believe that the Russian tank manufacturing industry has already reached its peak in terms of funding and human resources. Further growth will require significant investments in new production lines and modern equipment. At the same time, existing equipment is wearing out due to continuous operation. In this context, stringent international sanctions could become a key factor limiting further growth of the Russian defense industry.

The situation with armored vehicle buildup may take an unexpected turn: even with new workshops, Russia cannot fully compensate for tank losses at the 2022–2024 levels (around 1,000 tanks per year). However, since the second half of 2024, the invaders have increasingly used light transport vehicles — motorcycles and civilian cars — instead of tanks, which has reduced armored vehicle losses, albeit at the cost of higher personnel casualties.

Analysts calculated that about 200 tanks were lost in the first five months of 2025. This could total approximately 480 tanks for the year — half as many as last year. At this rate, Russia will be able to maintain the current level of armored vehicles for several more years. If losses remain low, the tank fleet could even grow by several hundred units annually.