Iran Uses UAE Shell Companies to Buy Missile and Drone Components

Iran Uses UAE Shell Companies to Buy Missile and Drone Components
An Iranian missile system displayed next to a banner depicting Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during Iran Defense Week on a street in Tehran, Iran, September 25, 2025 (Reuters)

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been purchasing Chinese satellite equipment for its missile and drone programs through a network of companies in the United Arab Emirates.

The Financial Times reported on this.

According to FT, the information is based on leaked commercial contracts, customs documents, and logistics records.

In late 2025, the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps received a shipment of Chinese military-grade satellite antennas through the UAE.

Journalists attributed a key role in the scheme to Telesun, a company registered in the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah.

Through the company, approximately 1.8 tons of Chinese-made satellite equipment were shipped from Shanghai to Iran via the Jebel Ali container port in Dubai.

A 4.5-meter antenna from the Chinese company StarWin. Photo credits: StarWin

The shipment included a 4.5-meter satellite antenna manufactured by the Chinese company StarWin. According to the documents, the cargo was declared as “antennas and accessories,” while the final recipient was the Iranian telecommunications company Ertebatat Faragostar Kish (EFK).

The Financial Times reports that EFK worked on a project for Saman Industrial Group, an entity added to the US sanctions list in 2023.

At the time, the US Treasury Department claimed that Saman was a front company for the Aerospace Forces Self Suffiency Jihad Organization, an IRGC research branch involved in the development of ballistic missiles, drones, and electronic warfare systems.

The Chinese container ship Zhong Gu Yin Chuan and the Iranian vessel Rama III were used to transport the cargo. According to the FT, Rama III transmitted false GPS coordinates during the voyage to Iran to conceal its route. Satellite imagery showed discrepancies between the vessel’s actual location and its navigation signals.

Shahed-136 drones in one of the underground bases of the IRGC Aerospace Forces, June 2025. Photo credits: noghtezan_info

Journalists established that after leaving the UAE, Rama III disappeared from its actual route near Oman, and later a vessel of similar size was recorded at Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas. The port was listed in the documents as the delivery point for the equipment.

A separate role in the logistics chain was played by Blue Calm Marine Services, which acted as a delivery agent in Iran.

The United States imposed sanctions on the company in 2023 for involvement in supplying components for Iran’s missile program.

The UAE currently serves as a transshipment hub for many deliveries not only to Iran, but also to Russia.

Previously, a major investigation by Militarnyi, based on data from the PRANA Network hacker group, which breached the servers of the Iranian intermediary company Sahara Thunder, reported that payments for UAV components were made through accounts of shell companies registered in the UAE, thereby concealing transactions from international financial monitoring.

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