Nearly Half of Russia’s 155 Ruselectronics Facilities Remain Unsanctioned — DIU

Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) has published data on 155 enterprises that are part of or managed by the Russian JSC Roselektronics.

The information appears in the Aggressor’s Military-Industrial Complex section of the War & Sanctions portal.

The holding is part of Russia’s state-owned Rostec corporation. It brings together specialized enterprises and research organizations across Russia.

These entities develop and manufacture radio-electronic components, communications equipment, and automated control systems. They also produce robotic systems, microwave electronics, and computing equipment.

The holding’s products are used in most types of Russian weaponry, particularly in ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs, and electronic warfare systems.

These components are also installed on military equipment, radar systems, and aviation communication systems.

Roselektronics includes enterprises involved in the joint production of 9M723 missiles for the Iskander-M system and 3M22 Zircon missiles. Among them is JSC Scientific Research Institute GIRICOND, which manufactures precision potentiometers for Zircons.

Another entity, JSC Scientific Research Center of Electronic Computing Technology (NICEVT), supplies flight data processing units for Iskander ballistic missiles. The list also includes JSC Scientific and Production enterprise INTEGRAL-V, which manufactures pulse and heating transformers for 9M723 missiles.

JSC INTEGRAL-V is currently not subject to sanctions imposed by any country in the sanctions coalition. Overall, restrictions have yet to be imposed on nearly half of the enterprises in the published list of holding company entities.

At the same time, the inclusion of GIRICOND and NICEVT on most countries’ sanctions lists has had little impact on overall missile production volumes. DIU notes that this highlights the need to improve mechanisms for monitoring compliance with restrictions.

Ukraine’s intelligence service stresses the necessity to strengthen accountability for sanctions violations. Partner countries should review their approaches to verifying product end users.

Components, equipment, software, and critical raw materials must not reach foreign intermediaries. Buyers must verify that the end recipient has no ties to Russia’s defense industry.

Ukrainian specialists had previously identified an NVIDIA Jetson Orin computing module in Russia’s new S-71M Monochrom air-launched cruise missile.