The SSU Exposed Hungarian Intelligence Agent Who Was Recruiting Ukrainians

The SSU exposed a Hungarian intelligence officer who, in 2025, led a Budapest-based spy network in Transcarpathia.

The SSU reported that in the spring of 2025, they detained two members of a spy ring who were gathering data on the region’s military defenses, local socio-political sentiments, and the possible reaction of the population in the event of the deployment of Hungarian troops there.

According to the case file, the activities of the foreign intelligence network were directed by a career officer of Hungarian military intelligence—André Zoltan.

It was established that he personally conducted intelligence meetings in Hungary with one of his informants from Transcarpathia, who had been spying in the western region of Ukraine and was subsequently detained by the SSU’s counterintelligence unit.

As the investigation revealed, from 2016 to 2020, Andre was in Georgia, where he carried out intelligence activities ‘under the cover’ of a representative of the Hungarian diplomatic mission.

“After returning from the South Caucasus in 2021, he began intelligence and subversive activities against Ukraine,” the SSU reported.

That same year, he personally recruited a former soldier from the Berehove district and placed him on ‘standby.’

“And in September 2024, Andre ‘activated’ the agent and instructed him to spy in Transcarpathia,” the SSU noted.

The agents’ tasks

It has been documented that the recruited citizen was gathering intelligence on the deployment locations of the Defense Forces, specifically attempting to identify the combat positions of Ukrainian air defense forces protecting the skies over Ukraine’s western region.

Also, on André’s orders, the agent was tasked with finding ‘candidates’ for recruitment into the Hungarian military intelligence network.

The foreign intelligence officer focused particularly on both former and current military personnel, as well as employees of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies.

Furthermore, according to available data, André utilized the facilities of Hungarian diplomatic missions in Transcarpathia for recruitment purposes. Local residents submitted applications containing personal data to these missions to obtain Hungarian citizenship. To entice cooperation, the foreign intelligence officer promised money and various benefits from Hungary.

It has been established that André conducted most of his recruitment conversations and agent meetings in his own car. For the sake of secrecy, he used an operational alias.

Thus, the next person André recruited was a former contract soldier from one of the combat brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. She was soon detained by the Security Service of Ukraine along with another agent.

Additionally, another Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemember was identified whom the Hungarian military intelligence officer attempted to recruit. Instead of monetary compensation, he promised this person regular supplies of narcotics for ‘personal use.’

It recently came to light that the Hungarian Foreign Minister is passing on to Russia ‘operational reports’ from EU meetings.