RUSI Analysis Identifies Vulnerabilities in Sukhoi Aircraft Production

An RUSI analysis dated November 1, 2025, titled Vulnerabilities in Sukhoi Production: Clipping Russia’s Wings, examined the state of Russia’s aircraft manufacturing industry amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The study identified key “bottlenecks” in Sukhoi aircraft production that are vulnerable to international sanctions and Ukrainian strikes.

According to the analysts, while primary aircraft manufacturing plants in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Novosibirsk, and Irkutsk are already under sanctions, a number of their suppliers have managed to avoid restrictions.

In November, the international intelligence community InformNapalm, in cooperation with the Fenix cyber center, published classified documents obtained through a multi-stage operation targeting the Russian company OKBM. OKBM specializes in producing components for strategic aviation and spacecraft. The leaked materials confirmed the Russian aviation industry’s heavy dependence on imported components.

Dependence on Imported Machine Tools and Electronics

The documents specifically highlighted reliance on imported CNC machine tools, the procurement of which has been significantly hindered by sanctions.

According to RUSI’s mapping, the most critical suppliers involved in the production of Sukhoi (“Su”) aircraft are located in the European part of Russia, placing them within range of Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities.

Among them are:

• UEC–UMPO (Ufa): A key manufacturer of aircraft engines for Sukhoi aircraft.
• VSMPO-AVISMA Corporation (Sverdlovsk Region): The leading supplier of titanium semi-finished products (beams, profiles) used in primary structural elements of the fuselage, wing spars, and landing gear components.
• Other metallurgical plants: Kamensk-Uralsky Metallurgical Plant (KUMZ), Elektrostal, Stupino Metallurgical Company, Ashinsky Metallurgical Plant, and Ruspolimet.
• Ryazan State Instrument-making Enterprise (RSIE): Manufactures radar systems (e.g., the Irbis-E radar) and “friend-or-foe” (IFF) identification systems.
• KNIRTI (Zhukovsky): A leading developer of Sukhoi radar systems and a site for final testing.
• Signal Plant (Stavropol): Assembles Khibiny-10M electronic warfare (EW) active jamming systems.
• Aviaavtomatika named after Tarasov (Kursk): Produces control boards for the Khibiny-10M EW systems and flight control systems.
• JSC Central Design Bureau of Automatics (Omsk): Manufactures radar warning receiver (RWR) systems.
• Obninsk Research and Production Enterprise Tekhnologiya named after A.G. Romashin: Produces fiberglass and carbon fiber used in fuselage and wing structures.
• SKIF-M (Belgorod): A critically important manufacturer of specialized drills and tools for machining aerospace materials. The company is described as a “problem solver” for the entire Sukhoi supply chain, as 70% of its output is dedicated to the aerospace sector.

A more general analysis of the leading avionics suppliers to the United Aircraft Corporation shows that most of the 12 leading design bureaus and suppliers are heavily dependent on imports of critical equipment and components, sourced through opaque supply channels involving little-known private importers.

Throughout 2024, this group of unsanctioned Russian importers supplying the 12 leading avionics vendors received shipments containing integrated circuits and capacitors worth more than USD 25 million. These shipments included products from brands such as Texas Instruments and Murata. The supplies often originated in China and were routed through small distributors in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. Most of these components can be identified within the supply chains of Sukhoi-branded aircraft.

Sukhoi components that depend on these import channels include critical equipment such as the communications system (NPP Polet), the flight control system (Elara), the engine control module, radar guidance and control systems, and, of course, the Khibiny electronic countermeasures system, developed and manufactured by KNIRTI.

Potential for New Sanctions

“Expanding the sanctions regime to include second- and third-tier suppliers in Sukhoi’s supply chain could help disrupt Russian aircraft production today and highlight to potential Russian export customers the risks of relying on Russia for aircraft maintenance and supply in the future,” the RUSI study states.

Coordinating these sanctions with an expanded Ukrainian deep-strike campaign, which could further disrupt Russian metallurgical and defense-industrial facilities over the next 12 months, could compound the effect, leaving Russia struggling to replace damaged equipment.