Belarusian MAZ Established a Supply of Parts from North Korea

Belarusian companies are circumventing sanctions by sourcing components from China and North Korea for the Belarusian and Russian military industries.

To do this, they use intermediaries from China, according to an investigation by the OSINT agency Dallas.

In particular, the Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ) has become a key link in schemes to circumvent Western sanctions against the Russian and Belarusian military industries.

Following economic restrictions on the company and its top management, MAZ strengthened its integration into the Russian defense industry.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, more than 80% of Belarusian companies fulfill Russian defense orders.

To do this, Belarusian factories have established a system to supply sanctioned components via Chinese intermediaries.

MAZ and Adamovich

The OSINT Center has identified one of the participants in this scheme as Alexei Adamovich, who worked at MAZ for over 20 years.

In 2023, he headed the commercial department of the Mikhanovich Logistics Center (MLC).

Formally, the MLC is positioned as a regular logistics hub, but in practice, it serves as the procurement hub for MAZ’s production lines.

This scheme allows the plant to conduct transactions that would otherwise lead to immediate sanctions, effectively “laundering” commercial relations through intermediaries.

One of Adamovich’s key clients is the Russian automobile plant Ural (UralAZ), which manufactures heavy military trucks and armored vehicles with mine protection, including the Ural-4320, Ural-63706, and Typhoon-U.

The production of this equipment is critically dependent on foreign components, particularly Chinese ones.

In Adamovich’s correspondence, investigators found contracts for the supply of military components under the guise of civilian parts.

In particular, the manager negotiated the purchase of transmission components for yuan, allegedly for civilian transport.

Involvement of China and North Korea

The correspondence also included proposals to establish a Chinese subsidiary in the Minsk Free Economic Zone to circumvent sanctions.

In presentations for the Russian market, the company openly stated that its products were suitable for military use, the agency reports.

Adamovich was also involved in purchasing components for MAZ in North Korea.

According to analysts, the Belarusian plant ordered large batches of parts from the Pyongyang-based company Chosun Kyonghun 1.

MAZ has ordered high-precision steering systems, complex electronic modules, polyurethane exhaust hoses, and suspension components for 2025.

“These are not isolated purchases, but systematic cooperation. According to international law, such actions are a direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions No. 2397 and No. 2375, which prohibit any trade with North Korean state structures,” the investigation states.

Although Adamovich was in direct contact with the coordinator of Chosun Kyonghun 1, the contracts were concluded through the Chinese intermediary company Shenyang Raimond Industrial Co.

The province where this company is located is a hub for illegal operations with the DPRK. In total, up to 90% of North Korea’s international trade goes through Chinese intermediaries.

Adamovich’s correspondence also revealed discussions about the so-called training of 460 North Korean workers in the garment industry in the Russian city of Ivanovo.

Observers suggest that the “training” is a cover for military work, as the agreement provides for payments of $500 to $700 per participant.