After France: How Africa Became the Battleground for Russo-French Hybrid Warfare

This material was prepared as part of the collaboration between the Militarnyi and the international analytical and information community Resurgam.

Over the past decade, there has been a breakdown in the established architecture of foreign policy cooperation in Africa: France has been displaced from 70% of countries where it previously maintained a military presence, while Russia has expanded its presence to nine countries, signing military-technology contracts with 43 states on the continent.

This military reconfiguration is a marker of a broader transformation of the political order in Africa. Russia’s hybrid warfare tools have opened the door to widespread restrictions on democratic procedures on the continent, and the model proposed by Russia, personalistic, asymmetrical, and politically undemanding, has proved attractive to autocracies.

The irreversible damage to France’s reputation as a “colonial country” negates the Western alternative and allows Russia to build its own brand as a “bulwark against colonialism” and the Western way of life, thereby strengthening the pole of autocratic regimes that challenge the global security architecture.

Emmanuel Macron’s “partnership of equals”: how colonial memory became an instrument of geopolitical confrontation

The content and functionality of France and Russia’s foreign policy doctrines on Africa have determined the nature of their confrontation. At the same time, a radical revision of the French approach, although not a starting point, created favorable conditions for Russia’s transition from a latent, particularly informational, presence in the region to an open military-political repositioning.

The French vision of a new policy towards Africa was articulated by President Emmanuel Macron at the University of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in 2017. In his speech, he stated that “there is no longer a French policy on Africa,” which was dubbed an “equal-to-equal partnership.” At that time, France’s military presence on the continent consisted of about 10,000 troops, stationed mainly in French-speaking West Africa and the Sahel. By 2026, most of the contingent had been withdrawn from their locations, often under pressure from large-scale protests, as was the case in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and a number of other countries.

Amid the withdrawal of French troops, these countries became the core of Russia’s presence in Africa, indicating the Russian Federation’s policy orientation towards the “French sphere of influence.” A 2024 European Parliament report records Russian military presence in 16 African countries, half of which are former French colonies. The others are either countries in deep humanitarian crises (Sudan, DR Congo) or major subregional leaders (Libya, Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, etc.). Prior to the plane crash on August 23, 2023, and the subsequent reorganization of the structure headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group and its network of affiliated companies covered all Russian activities in Africa.

Nevertheless, the foundations for “boots on the ground” were laid at a deeper, doctrinal level and were reactive to changes in the French central framework. Macron’s “partnership of equals” was the direct opposite of Nicolas Sarkozy’s previous “Eurafrica” doctrine and, before that, the neocolonial Françafrique system. In the logic of France’s long-standing approach to Africa, Macron’s course has brought the colonial past to the forefront of France’s public policy in Africa in an unprecedented way. Accordingly, the success of the French strategy in Africa has become critically dependent on how convincingly this new framework will be entrenched in the public consciousness of the countries in the region.

The disinformation component of Russia’s presence in Africa

Russia’s activity in Africa goes beyond classic geopolitical competition and is best described by the concept of hybrid warfare — nonlinear, asymmetric activity that allows one to operate below the threshold of open warfare but still achieve strategic results. In the African case, this involves adapting the model of hybrid warfare tested in Ukraine, coordinated by the GRU and implemented through private military companies.

Described by the author of the term, Frank Hoffman, as a product of the “information age,” hybrid warfare assumes that control over narratives is key among its tools. According to the US Department of Defense’s Africa Center, in 2024, 23 transnational disinformation campaigns were recorded on the African continent, 16 of which were of Russian origin. For a long time, Russia has remained the largest source of external disinformation in Africa.

The Russian Federation’s disinformation component in Africa is implemented as part of the Lakhta project, created by Yevgeny Prigozhin to “counter anti-Russian propaganda.” However, the African dimension of disinformation is not an autonomous phenomenon, but part of the global architecture of Russian information influence. The Lakhta project networks have been blamed for meddling in the US elections, spying in Argentina, and faking government websites in Europe, among other things.

In Africa, the dominant frame of Russian information operations against France is structured around two interrelated directions: legitimizing the presence of the Wagner PMC and delegitimizing France. These narratives took various local forms, but in most materials, the appeal to France’s colonial past and its prolongation in contemporary neocolonial practices remains unchallenged. At the organizational level, the infrastructure of the disinformation component consists of Russian cultural institutions, diplomatic missions, and media networks. “Russian Houses” perform the function of adapting the narrative to local characteristics, while Russian diplomatic missions act as curators of public organizations that imitate participation in the public sphere.

At the same time, the digital presence of African users is growing rapidly: over the past seven years, more than 300 million Africans have registered on social networks. At the same time, African audiences demonstrate some of the world’s highest rates of dependence on social platforms as their primary source of news consumption. This growth in media activity has been exploited by the Russian Federation: campaigns that imitate authentic civic activity are increasingly becoming the main form of disinformation. The narratives begin to spread “from the bottom up” — from paid local influencers, whose messages are immediately picked up by a network of bots, Russian state media, radio, and other communication channels.

Some of the bloggers and experts whose activities are based on anti-French rhetoric have a significant audience, including Franco-Beninese activist Kemi Seba, who has 1.5 million followers on Facebook. Another example is Swiss-Cameroonian journalist Nathalie Yamb, who has over 578,000 subscribers on YouTube and is known as “la Dame de Sochi” (the Lady of Sochi) after her anti-French speech at the Russia-Africa Summit in 2019. Both media figures were also among the participants of the second, much less successful summit in St. Petersburg in 2023.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that France remained passive in the conflict, its response was based on a similar logic of conducting asymmetric operations, as evidenced by Meta’s large-scale exposure of French disinformation networks targeting Mali and the CAR in 2019-2020. At this stage, a structural asymmetry between democracies and authoritarian regimes becomes apparent: the exposure of French networks had political and reputational consequences, while Russian structures demonstrated high adaptability through their ability to quickly rebrand and reconfigure distribution channels that mimic social movements. This allows for the effective dissemination of disinformation in the “gray zone” of digital platform moderation.

The dismantling of democratic institutions as a condition for expanding Russia’s presence in Africa

According to the Africa Center, 13 of the 28 African countries where Russia conducts disinformation campaigns are in conflict, accounting for three-quarters of all African countries in the active phase of conflict. The chronic structural vulnerabilities of the Sahel have created an environment conducive to the escalation of violence, through which external actors derive disproportionate benefits. It is noteworthy that France previously used a strategy similar to Russia’s, beginning to rebuild its presence through the Serval counterterrorism operation in Mali, which expanded into the Barkhane campaign, in which 6,500 troops were deployed in five Sahel countries.

However, the difference is that Russia’s approach to Africa is clearly anti-democratic. The main categories of Russian activity include disinformation (22 countries), support for unconstitutional claims to power, and interference in elections — all of which are essentially aimed at undermining democracy. Russia consistently supports and legitimises constitutional changes that allow for the extension of presidential terms in exchange for the personal loyalty of African leaders. Corresponding information campaigns have been recorded in at least 15 countries. Russia has interfered in the electoral process in 18 countries, most recently in Uganda, where it supported for at least the third time President Yoweri Museveni, who was re-elected for the seventh time. Moreover, Russian disinformation encourages violence in target countries by systematically sabotaging development programs, humanitarian aid, and educational projects. To a lesser extent, information attacks have also targeted UN peacekeeping missions deployed in Russia’s sphere of interest: MINUSCA in the CAR, MINUSMA in Mali, and MONUSCO in the DR Congo.

After France’s withdrawal from a number of African countries, there has been a trend toward authoritarianism in those countries. In countries with preserved, albeit limited, democratic procedures, France acted as a guarantor of civil society and independent media — key elements in stabilizing fragmented societies. Accordingly, the delegitimization of democratic institutions is taking place precisely through the discrediting of France’s role in Africa. The result is a model of controlled destabilization, where local crises become opportunities for Russian penetration.

Isolated regimes as hubs of Russian presence: guarantees of survival for military juntas in exchange for restrictions on state sovereignty

The Russian model of presence is structured around the use of the personal loyalty of African leaders. The Central African Republic is the backbone of Russia’s presence in Africa, which corresponds to a broader model of providing military support in the fight against threats: President Faustin-Archange Touadéra came to power with a programmatic promise to make the CAR “the most peaceful country in the world,” symbolized by the withdrawal of 2,500 French troops. Instead, the country effectively plunged into civil war, caused by the activities of rebel groups united in the Séléka coalition (CPSK–CPJP–UFDR). In a situation of security vacuum, characterized by the virtual absence of capable autonomous institutions, African leaders are looking for alternative formats of external support. In such circumstances, the Russian Federation gains a competitive advantage, because in addition to direct military assistance, it provides political protection.

As part of its efforts in this direction, the disinformation component is primarily aimed at discrediting French troops. For example, in 2023, a large-scale campaign was launched around the killing of nine Chinese citizens at a gold mine in Chimbol, CAR, which was controlled by mercenaries from the Wagner Group. The crime was presented as a secret French operation aimed at undermining Russia’s military presence in Africa. At the same time, the purpose of these campaigns has likely shifted from driving French troops out of the region to a tool for managing responsibility — masking their own failures in the “war on jihadism” and diverting attention from the crimes committed by Wagner PMC mercenaires in their areas of deployment.

In countries where Russia’s presence is due to its involvement in armed conflict, the key, though not the only, motive for cooperation is to achieve measurable results in countering threats, such as containing rebel groups or regaining control over territories. The inability to demonstrate tangible results is a factor limiting cooperation. On the other hand, support for isolated military juntas is a much more reliable, basic strategy for Russia in Africa. This logic is reflected in the experience of countries with the closest cooperation with Russia: Mali, where two military coups took place in less than a year, ultimately bringing General Assimi Goita to power; Burkina Faso, with two rapid coups that established the rule of Ibrahim Traoré; and Niger, with the uprising of the presidential guard, which resulted in the regime of Aboubacar Keita.

The role of anti-French mobilization in shaping the preconditions for military coups in the Sahel countries

The series of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger share common features, including chronological proximity, similarity in course, and similar political consequences, which together have been of critical benefit to Russia. Although the local crises were caused by the weakness of state institutions and the deterioration of the security environment, it is the Russian Federation that is responsible for preparing the informational and political groundwork. In 2019, Meta reported the exposure of three networks of fake accounts, covering about 200 pages and reaching an audience of over a million users, concentrated in eight countries in the Sahel and West Africa. Analysis of these networks showed that they had been operating for a long time: some accounts had been active since 2014 and were reoriented to support the Malian campaign as early as 2017, four years before the coup. In September of the same year, the NGO Groupe des Patriotes du Mali launched a campaign to deepen cooperation with Russia, within which Russian Ambassador to Mali Alexei Dulyan officially accepted a petition to expand Russia’s presence. In 2020, these activities were supplemented by the Yerewolo debout sur les remparts, responsible for a series of violent attacks on French military personnel. Both groups identify themselves as “close to the regime” of Assimi Goïta, who came to power only in 2021.

After the military coup in Mali and the rapid withdrawal of French troops, the Russian Federation began to create a network targeting the wider Sahel region. At this stage, the Wagner Group began to be used on a large scale, with its media presence serving as a harbinger of military coups in the countries. The military coup in Burkina Faso took place in January 2022. Almost two years earlier, in 2019, the page “Défendons notre pays le Burkina Faso” began operating, focusing on the need to bring the Wagner PMC into the country. From 2019 to 2021, the number of mentions of the Wagner PMC increased 19-fold, and interaction with publications mentioning the group increased by 6,363%. Amid these reports, a coup took place in Niger in July 2023.

What’s next: moving east and testing the limits of democratic systems

Despite the withdrawal of French troops from the region, Russia has not yet managed to gain a foothold in any country on the Atlantic coast of West Africa. The Sahel, a landlocked region, has become the main platform for Russian entrenchment on the continent, but this presence is resource-intensive and requires significant financial, political, and military investments. This leads to the further forced expansion of Russian influence towards countries with strategic locations.

Russia’s key priority remains the war against Ukraine, which limits its ability to invest in Africa. Asymmetric warfare methods allow it to gain influence with an index of 1% of total direct investment on the continent. The “weapons for resources” strategy has provided Russia with additional financial inflows: according to the World Gold Council, Russia has received at least $2.5 billion since the start of the full-scale war, a figure that is likely to be underestimated given the impossibility of accurately assessing the scale of illegal gold mining in Sudan and Mali. Moreover, the use of strategic raw materials and human resources also serves this purpose. At the same time, Russia seeks to convert its presence in the region into political support on the international stage. Africa, with its 54 votes, remains the largest regional bloc in the UN General Assembly, including three non-permanent members of the Security Council, 14 members of ECOSOC, and 13 members of the Human Rights Council.

The Russian Federation’s move to the southeast is already a well-established mechanism. The countries in Russia’s zone of interest are in close proximity to key Western allies on the continent — Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, and others — which have established democratic traditions and relatively strong state institutions. However, even at the height of anti-colonial sentiment in African countries in 2021, the UK was able to retain its military bases in Kenya as a result of negotiations.

At the same time, the war in Ukraine is transforming French policy in Africa. Paris is redirecting resources toward Europe and seeking more cost-effective partnership formats, cutting back on development and humanitarian aid programs, which is in line with the broader logic of the EU. Symptomatic of this was the abolition in August 2023 of the list of priority partner countries, as well as a series of statements about strategic repositioning in 2024-2025. The central framework remains the concept of “partnership of equals,” although now with a special focus on East Africa. According to Macron, the 2026 summit in Nairobi should “embody a real revolution in our approach.”

Russia’s hybrid war in Africa shows signs of escalation, albeit with fixed changes in format. Despite the established frameworks of disinformation campaigns, stronger democratic institutions, and the adaptation of government policies and regulatory practices of media platforms determine the limited reproductive potential of Russia’s strategy outside the Sahel. At the same time, the Russian side is facing difficulties with recruitment, financing, and institutionalization of its security presence, which became evident during the replacement of the Wagner PMC with the Africa Corps, which raised questions among African leaders.

At the same time, there is reason to believe that the intensity of the confrontation will not only continue but will also increase as the new election cycle in West Africa approaches. Russia has already integrated itself into this process, particularly in Nigeria, where it redirected more than 40% of Nollywood’s active audience to its own network accounts, which criticized the West and encouraged revolution in West Africa. Business Day estimates that disinformation and piracy cost Nigerian industries more than $1.5 billion annually. Therefore, in the near future, it is precisely at this point that the effectiveness of Russia’s modern hybrid strategy and the limits of democracy’s adaptability to it will be tested simultaneously.